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I. INTRODUCTION
The wave of teachers’ strikes that began in the spring of
2018 and have continued into 20191 is one of the most
impressive examples of labor militancy in at least the past half
century. The strikes are remarkable in their number, coming as
they do in a period of declining strike rates in the U.S.2 They are
stunning in their level of success, especially compared to the
results of other famous strikes by public-sector unions such as
the PATCO strike of the 1981, the New York Transit Workers of
2005, and the Hortonville teachers’ strike of 1974.3 And they are
fascinating in that the spring 2018 strikes took place in states
which not only barred strikes by any public employees, but also
did not authorize collective bargaining for any public
employees.4
Successful teacher union activism is not new. In 1916,
Fursman v. Chicago5 upheld a rule that barred Chicago teachers
from membership in the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT).6 Yet after several years of political activism, the AFT was
the
twentieth
able to get the rule repealed.7 Throughout
century, both the AFT and the National Education Association

1. Since the strikes of spring 2018 that are the main subject of this essay, charter
school teachers in Chicago and Parma, Ohio have gone on a successful strikes, as
have public-school teachers in Los Angeles. See Jennifer Medina & Dana Goldstein,
Success of Los Angeles Teachers Strike Rocks Charter Schools, and a Rich Supporter,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/us/charter-schoolslos-angeles.html; Patrick O’Donnell, Teachers OK Contract to End Strike at Summit
Academy Charter School in Parma, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (March 1, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2019/03/teachers-ok-contract-to-end-strike-atsummit-academy-charter-school-in-parma.html.
2. Abigail Abrams, The Number of U.S. Workers Involved in a Strike in 2018 Was the
Highest Since 1986, TIME (Feb. 8, 2019), http://time.com/5525512/american-workersstrikes-bureau-labor-statistics/.
3. See infra for discussions of these strikes.
4. The strikes took place in Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and West Virginia. Abrams, supra note 2. None of these states grant collective
bargaining rights to teachers. RICHARD KEARNEY & PATRICE MARESCHAL, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 64-65 (5th ed. 2014). Strikes by any public
employee are illegal in almost all these states. Id. at 245-46.
5. Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917) (reasoning the Chicago
School Board had the right to decline to employ or re-employ any applicant for any
reason whatever or for no reason at all).
6. Id. at 325–26, 116 N.E. at 160.
7. JOSEPH SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 41 (2004).
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(NEA) represented teachers in a variety of ways: lobbying for
civil service and tenure laws; representing teachers under such
laws; forging informal agreements with employers over wages,
hours, and working conditions; and, in the later decades of the
twentieth century, engaging in formal collective bargaining and
even striking.8
These activities are, of course, what unions are known for.
Crucially, though, teachers’ unions have engaged in these
activities under the umbrella of public-sector labor laws, laws
that have always been significantly more restrictive than the
laws that govern unions in the private sector. Most privatesector workers are governed by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)9 or the Railway Labor Act (RLA).10 These federal
statutes, passed in 1935 and 1926 respectively, provide, at least
on paper, a relatively robust right to bargain collectively and to
strike.11 Public-sector labor law, however, is generally a matter
of state or even local government law. While public-sector laws
vary tremendously, a clear majority of them bar strikes by all
public employees.12 A significant minority of states do not even
authorize collective bargaining by most or even any public
employees.13 Public-sector laws were also enacted significantly
later than private-sector laws. The first public-sector laws were
enacted in the 1960s, and a number were enacted in the 1980s or
later.14 Further, in the twenty-first century, laws granting rights
to public-sector unions have been under attack. These attacks
include, but are not limited to, Act 10 in Wisconsin (practically
eliminating collective bargaining rights for all public employees
not in “protective services);15 a similar repeal of rights in Iowa;16
and the Janus decision,17 which held that any union security
8. See SLATER, supra note 7, at 39-96.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2019).
10. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq (2019).
11. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); Railway
Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926).

12. See generally SETH HARRIS

ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC SECTORS 811 (2d ed. 2016).
13. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 64-65. Strikes by any public employee
are illegal in all these states. Id. at 245-46.
14. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 55.
15. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 73-75.
16. In 2017, Iowa enacted House File 291, which is largely modeled after Wisconsin
Act 10. H.F. 291, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ia. 2017) (enacted),
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ba=HF291&ga=87.
17. Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).
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clause that obligated a member of a union bargaining unit to pay
any dues to help defray representation costs the union was
obligated to provide violated the First Amendment.18
In this climate, teachers struck in states where they had no
right to bargain collectively, much less strike. The relevant
government employers and officials had no obligation to engage
in any negotiations with them, and indeed could have fired all of
them for striking.19 That they actually gave in to teacher
demands and did not fire anyone demonstrates that practical
realities may outweigh legal rights in some labor relations. Still,
illegal strikes remain fraught with risks for employees, and one
can simultaneously admire the teachers’ organizational skills
and victories while wondering if periodic illegal wide-spread
work stoppages are the optimal way to conduct labor relations
on an ongoing basis.
This essay addresses the historical context of these strikes.
First, it describes the historical background and evolution of the
wildly inconsistent and often woefully inadequate public-sector
labor laws in the U.S. It will describe how this regime evolved
so differently than private-sector labor law in the U.S., and
indeed differently than laws governing public-sector workers in
comparable countries, where bargaining and strike rights for
teachers are much more common.20 Second, it gives some
examples of how teachers’ unions have dealt with severe legal
restrictions on their activities in the past: sometimes not as
successfully as recently. Finally, it will consider the
consequences of the current legal regime for unions, employees,
and employers going forward.

18. Id. at 2460.
19. See Steven Greenhouse, Making Teachers’ Strikes Illegal Won’t Stop Them, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/teacher-strikesillegal-arizona-carolina.html.
20. See generally REGULATING STRIKES IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE ‘LAW
IN ACTION’ PERSPECTIVE (Moti Mironi & Monika Schlachter, eds., 2019) (covering
relevant laws in the U.S. and thirteen other countries) [hereinafter REGULATING
STRIKES].
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II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS TO BARGAIN AND STRIKE IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
A. The Pre-Collective Bargaining Era
Strikes by public employees were illegal everywhere in the
U.S. until the 1970s, when a few states authorized them in
limited circumstances.21 Even today, only a dozen states make
any strikes by any type of public employee legal in any
circumstances.22 On the other hand, a majority of states
currently authorize some form of collective bargaining for at
least some public employees, including teachers.23 Thus, in a
majority of states, teachers (and other public employees) have a
legal right to bargain collectively, but no legal right to strike.
Instead, public-sector labor laws contain various, but at least
somewhat standardized, alternative methods for resolving
bargaining impasses, using combinations of mediation, “factfinding” and various types of interest arbitration.24 But even
today, eight U.S. states do not permit any public employees to
bargain collectively, and around a dozen more only let one-tofour categories of public employees bargain collectively.25
This is not “natural,” in that most other first world
countries have much more robust bargaining and strike rights
for teachers and most other public employees.26 Why did labor
laws governing public employees develop so differently in the
U.S. than elsewhere, with legal rights for public-sector unions
coming much later and often in a much more limited fashion
than rights for private-sector employees?
The first reason is the Boston police strike of 1919.27 While
public workers had no rights to organize or bargain, much less
strike, at that time, some government employees had organized
into unions as early as the 1830s.28 By the second decade of the

21. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
22. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 245-46.
23. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 64-65.
24. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891-940.
25. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 65-66, 245-46, 269-70.
26. See Joseph Slater, United States, in REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 477513.

27. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80; see generally SLATER, supra note
4, at 13-38.

28. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80.
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twentieth century, levels of public-sector unionization were
starting to rise.29 Several major public-sector unions (including
but not limited to the American Federation of Teachers) formed
and/or affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
In 1919, the AFL began chartering police unions; this prompted
intense opposition from public and private employers.30 After
Boston police officers formed an AFL-affiliated union, the local
police commissioner barred such affiliation.31 Police union
leaders refused to leave the AFL; the commissioner suspended
several of them; and in response, almost all police officers in
Boston went on an illegal strike in September 1919.32 For a few
days, Boston suffered lawlessness and some deaths related to
the strike.33
The aftermath of the strike hurt public-sector unions for
decades. Many local governments barred any public employees
from affiliating with the AFL.34 For example, Seattle required
public-school teachers to sign “yellow dog”35 contracts stating the
teacher would not join a union while employed as a teacher.36
Courts upheld such bans until the late 1960s.37 The union
density rate in the public sector fell in the 1920s, and for many
decades to come, union opponents invoked the Boston strike to
oppose any proposal that any type of public employee should
have the right to bargain collectively.38
Apart from the Boston strike, Constitutional law and the
highly subdivided nature of government in the U.S. helped
prevent public employees from winning bargaining and strike
rights. First, in the New Deal era and beyond, the Tenth
29. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 479-80.
30. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480.
31. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480.
32. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480.
33. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 1338.
34. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 3538.
35. Yellow dog contracts seek to reduce labor union participation by asking
employees not to join a union or to resign if they are already a member. Yellow Dog
Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
36. SLATER, supra note 7, at 39-70.
37. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 58-63. See, e.g., AFSCME Local 201 v. City of
Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197 (1963) (upholding bar on police affiliating
with the AFL).
38. REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20, at 480; see also SLATER, supra note 7, at 1338.
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Amendment would have been a significant obstacle to a federal
law regulating the labor relations of states and their
subdivisions. It was not until the 1980s that the Supreme Court
held that the Tenth Amendment did not bar application of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to states and their subdivisions.39
Further, counties, cities, and even political subdivisions of cities
such as school boards, had significant political independence,
and political leaders of such entities, e.g. school boards, opposed
giving their employees collective bargaining rights.40
With no statutes giving rights to public-sector unions, state
courts made the “common law” of public-sector labor law, and
these courts were quite deferential to arguments public officials
made that unionization of their workers was harmful. Also, in
the mid-20th century, some courts relied on the “non-delegation
doctrine”41 to hold that even voluntary collective bargaining by
public employers was an unconstitutional delegation of public
power (e.g., to set wages of public employees) to a private party
(a union).42
Further, even though after the Boston police strike through
the early1960s, public-sector unions effectively renounced the
strike weapon, judges still routinely upheld bars on public-sector
workers merely belonging to unions, reasoning that membership
would inevitably lead to strikes. Judges could not conceive of
labor relations that did not involve strikes. The fact that publicsector unions from the 1920s through the 1950s rarely actually
struck did not matter.43
B. The Era of Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Begins in the 1960s
The first public-sector labor law was passed in Wisconsin in
39. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
40. See generally Joseph Slater, United States, in REGULATING STRIKES, supra note
20.

41. “The non-delegation doctrine is a principle in administrative law that Congress
cannot delegate its legislative powers to other entities. This prohibition typically
involves Congress delegating its powers to administrative agencies or to private
organizations.” Nondelegation Doctrine, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine (last visited June 6, 2019).
42. SLATER, supra note 7, at 71-96.
43. See generally Joseph Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union is”:
How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)Constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor
Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981 (2000).
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1959, and then amended in 1962.44 This event is also important
because of how it dealt with the strike issue. Proponents of
public-sector collective bargaining in Wisconsin began
attempting to pass such a law in 1951, but progress stalled,
often over a question that remains central in current publicsector labor law. Assuming public-sector unions are not allowed
to strike, how can bargaining impasses be resolved? The
Wisconsin law finally passed with forms of mediation
substituted for strikes.45 In subsequent decades, states would
develop further alternatives to resolve bargaining impasses,
notably “fact-finding” and “interest arbitration,” discussed below.
The Wisconsin law was the beginning of a national trend.
Federal employees won a limited right to bargain collectively in
1962, when President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988.46
By 1966, sixteen states had enacted laws granting organizing
and bargaining rights to at least some public workers.47 By the
end of the 1970s, a majority of states had adopted such laws.
Public-sector unionization increased rapidly as well.48 In 1955,
all the public-sector unions put together had a combined
membership of around 400,000; by the 1970s, the total was more
than 4,000,000.49 By 1975, the union density rate in the public
sector equaled that of the private sector (around 25 percent).50
The public-sector rate then increased to about 38 percent in
1979, and has stayed around that level ever since.51
Also, in the late 1960s, courts held for the first time that the
First Amendment prevents a public employer from firing or
otherwise discriminating against a public employee because of
union activities.52 This was a major departure from cases in the
first half of the twentieth century, and it put an end to “yellow
44. See SLATER, supra note 7, at 158-92; see generally Paul Moreno, The History of
Public-Sector Unionism (2011) (Hillsdale College), https://www.hillsdale.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/FMF-2011-The-History-of-Public-Sector-Unionism.pdf.
45. For more details on this, see SLATER, supra note 7, at 158-92.
46. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1962).
47. SLATER, supra note 7, at 191.
48. SLATER, supra note 7, at 191-93.
49. SLATER, supra note 7, at 193; see AFSCME: 75 Years of History,
https://www.afscme.org/union/history/afscme-75-years-of-history (last visited June 6,
2019).
50. Henry Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence Between
the Public and Private Sectors, Working Paper #503, Princeton University Industrial
Relations Section (2005), http://harris.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/503.pdf.
51. Id.
52. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 65.
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dog” contracts and other bans on union membership in the
public sector that were common through the early 1960s.
However, this constitutional right has never included the right
to bargain collectively or the right to strike.53
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of relative militancy for
many public-sector unions, especially teachers (although nothing
approaching the rate of strikes in the private sector in that era).
The 1980s and beyond has seen a steep decline in public-sector
strike rates.54 For example, there were many more strikes in the
public sector in the state of Ohio in the period of 1974-79 (282)
than in the longer period of 1984-1992 (110).55 The even longer
period of 2000-10 saw even fewer strikes (43).56 Significantly, the
low strike rates in the public sector persisted even in states
which made strikes by most public employees legal, such as
Ohio.57 This is due in large part to the alternative impasse
resolution mechanisms discussed further below.
Before the teachers’ strikes of 2018, the most famous strike
by public workers in the 1980s and after was conducted by
federal air traffic controllers (PATCO, the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Union) in 1981.58 That strike was soundly
defeated. PATCO was decertified, all the strikers lost their jobs,
and some were actually jailed under provisions of federal law
which make strikes against the federal government a crime.59
Public transport workers struck in New York City in 2005, and
that strike also did not end well for the union, featuring, among
other things, an injunction, crippling fines, and a forfeiture of
the right to use dues check-off.60
In sum, today, states use one of three models for public
employees such as teachers: (a) such employees have no legal

53. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 65-71.
54. MARTIN MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 367
(3d ed. 2016).
55. Joseph Slater, The Rise and Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in
Historical and Political Context, 43 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 473, 480-81 (2012).
56. Id. While Ohio is one of the states that permit some public employees to strike,
that rule was not enacted until 1983, so the public-sector strike rate in that state
was highest when all such strikes were illegal. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Greenhouse, supra note 19.
59. For a detailed description of this strike, see JOSEPH MCCARTIN, COLLISION
COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT
CHANGED AMERICA (2011).
60. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874-84 (collecting cases).
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right to bargain or strike (a minority approach); (b) such
employees have a right to bargain, and some have a legal right
to strike (another minority approach); and (c) such employees
have a right to bargain collectively but no right to strike (the
plurality approach).
This legal structure is unusual. The U.S. does not follow
international law or practices regarding strike rights or
collective bargaining rights for public workers.61 Indeed, in 2007,
in response to a complaint by a union, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) called on North Carolina to repeal its
statutory ban on all collective bargaining in the public sector in
that state.62
Further, again, all the states in which teachers struck in
the spring of 2018 were states in which teachers had neither the
right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively. This is a
minority approach today, and in some ways, it was as if these
strikes had taken place in the past.
III. TEACHER STRIKES IN THE PAST
For most of the period after the Boston police strike until
the 1960s, teachers and other public employees generally
refrained from striking.63 This does not mean teachers’ unions
were inactive. For example, the relatively large Chicago
Teachers Union in this era fought for civil service rules and
against patronage, engaged in political activities, and won one of
the first teacher salary schedules not segregated by sex.64 This
was typical for public-sector unions in this era.65
There were some teacher strikes in this period, mostly in
the 1940s. Teachers struck in twelve states in 1943 (winning

61. For descriptions of legal rules and practices in a variety of other countries, see
REGULATING STRIKES, supra note 20.
62. MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 418-19; see generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (2007),
http://southernworker.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/08/ILO-Decision-onUS-and-North-Carolina.pdf containing the decision in Case No. 2460, Complaint
against the Government of the United States by the United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers
63. SLATER, supra note 7, at 71-96.
64. Slater, supra note 7, at 41; see also John LYONS, TEACHERS AND REFORM:
CHICAGO PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1929-70 (2008).
65. SLATER, supra note 7, at 41, 71-96.
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significant salary increases).66 In 1946, teachers in Norwalk,
Connecticut, St. Paul, Minnesota, and New Jersey successfully
struck.67 Teachers also struck successfully in Buffalo in 194647;68 in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Jersey City in 1948,69
and in Providence, Rhode Island in 1950.70 In the 1950s,
however, teacher militancy was rare, outside New Jersey which
saw nine strikes in that decade.71
The 1960s and 1970s, however, saw an explosion of
teachers’ strikes, mostly involving teachers affiliated with the
AFT seeking recognition and labor contracts. New York City
teachers, led by future AFT president Albert Shanker, engaged
in a successful one-day strike in 1960.72 In 1964, 300 AFT
members in Louisville struck for higher pay.73 In 1965, a third
of the teachers in South Bend, Indiana struck for four days.74
There were approximately 300 teachers’ strikes in the 1960s,
including more than 100 in 1967 alone.75 These strikes were
typically short: usually less than a week.76 Pittsburgh teachers
held an eleven-day strike in 1968.77 Perhaps most famously, the
United Federation of Teachers strike involving the Ocean HillBrownsville neighborhoods in Brooklyn created tensions
between labor and civil rights groups.78 In the 1975-76 school

66. The Morning Delivery, A Brief History of Teacher Strikes in the United States
(Sept. 12, 2012), available at: https://www.wplucey.com/2012/09/a-short-history-ofteacher-strikes-in-the-united-states.html.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. JON SHELTON, TEACHER STRIKE!: PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW
AMERICAN POLITICAL ORDER 33 (2017).
73. Id. at 34.
74. Id.
75. Jon Shelton, Red State Strikes and the Roots of Teacher Militancy, Labor and
Working-Class History Association Newsletter 7 (Dec. 2018) [hereinafter Red State
Strikes]; see also SHELTON, supra note 72, at 35.
76. Red State Strikes, supra note 54, at 7. For more details, see SHELTON, supra note
72, at 33-48.
77. For more details, see SHELTON, supra note 72, at 38-43.
78. See generally DENNIS GAFFNEY, TEACHERS UNITED: THE RISE OF NEW YORK
STATE UNITED TEACHERS (2007); JERALD E. PODAIR, THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED
NEW YORK: BLACKS, WHITES, AND THE OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE CRISIS (2002); See
also Dana Goldstein, The Tough Lessons of the 1968 Teacher Strikes, THE NATION
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/tough-lessons-1968-teacherstrikes/.
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year, there were over 200 teachers’ strikes, including an illegal
week-long strike in New York City protesting cuts in education
funding.79 The length of strikes increased in the 1970s.80 For
example, teachers in Newark struck for a month in 1970 and for
three months in 1971.81 In the 1972-73 school year, teachers in
Philadelphia struck for nearly three months.82 In 1979, St. Louis
teachers struck for six weeks.83
The vast majority of these strikes were illegal.84 Vermont
had given municipal employees a limited right to strike in 1967,
but beyond that, public employees, including teachers, had no
legal right to strike in the 1960s.85 In the 1970s, a few states
legalized strikes. Pennsylvania granted a limited strike right to
teachers and some other public employees in 1970.86 Hawaii and
Minnesota followed suit in 1970 and 1975, respectively.87 In the
1980s, a few other states granted the right to strike, including
Illinois and Ohio, both in 1983.88 In the vast majority of states,
however, teacher strikes remain illegal through today. Limited
legal strike rights also did not guarantee success. In 1975-76,
teachers struck in Pittsburgh, but that act was controversial,
and the union did not achieve its goals.89
From the 1980s until 2018, teachers struck much less
frequently.90 By the first decade of the 21st century, there were
only about a dozen teachers’ strikes per year.91 This is consistent
with a general and precipitous drop in strike rates in the U.S.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics lists the number of strikes in the
U.S. that involved at least 1,000 workers.92 In 1967, there were

79. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7.
80. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7.
81. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7.
82. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7.
83.Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 7.
84. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
85. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
86. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
87. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
88. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 941.
89. For more details and debate regarding the strike, see SHELTON, supra note 72, at
143-59.

90. Red State Strikes, supra note 75, at 8.
91. Red State Strikes, supra noter 75, at 8.
92. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 1: Work stoppages involving 1,000 or
more workers, 1947-2017 (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.htm
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381 such strikes;93 in 1977, there were 298;94 in 1987, there were
46;95 in 1997, there were 29;96 in 2007, there were 21;97 and in
2017, there were 7.98
IV. THE 2018 STRIKES IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR LAW
While the teachers’ strikes of 2018 took place under legal
regimes more common in the first half of the 20th century, there
were very modern reasons for the strikes. Total state and local
funding to public education was lower in 2017 than in 2008 in
thirty-six states;99 220,000 education jobs were cut in this period
even as enrollments grew by over 1,000,000.100 More specifically,
funding for K-12 education on a per-pupil basis, adjusted for
inflation, from 2008-17 dropped 26.91% in Oklahoma,101 13.11%
in Kentucky,102 12.76% in Arizona,103 9.9% in North Carolina,104
and 9.5% in West Virginia.105
While these cuts represent politics and priorities beyond
labor law, it is useful to consider the alternatives labor law has
created to deal with workplace issues. Because while some of the
strikes described above ended relatively positively for the union,
a number of illegal strikes ended very badly for unions and the
communities they were in. For example, in 1971, in Reese,
Michigan, teachers struck and the school district fired all fortyfour of its teachers.106 In 1974, in Dearborn Heights, Michigan,
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Joseph McCartin, Introduction, 15(4) LABOR: STUDIES

IN WORKING CLASS
HISTORY 93, 94 (2018).
100. Id.
101. Michael Leachman, State K-12 Funding Still Lacking in Many States, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL. PRIORITIES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/state-k-12funding-still-lagging-in-many-states (click on Oklahoma in interactive map to display
percentages).
102. Id. (click on Kentucky in the interactive map to display percentages).
103. Id. (click on Arizona in the interactive map to display percentages).
104. Id. (click on North Carolina in the interactive map to display percentages).
105. Id. (click on West Virginia in the interactive map to display percentages).
106. Emily Lawler, ‘Illegal’ teacher strikes common in Michigan long before Detroit
Public Schools sick-outs, MICHIGAN NEWS (Jan. 25, 2016),
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the Crestwood School District fired 184 teachers for striking
illegally.107 The teachers challenged their discharge before the
Michigan Supreme Court, and lost.108 In 1974-75, teachers in
Hortonville, Wisconsin engaged in one of the bitterest strikes in
that state’s history.109 An estimated 240 replacement teachers
were used, the strike was defeated, and nearly all the striking
teachers lost their jobs.110 The workers appealed their case to the
U.S. Supreme Court on due process grounds, but lost there as
well.111 Unsuccessful illegal strikes by public workers are not
limited to teachers, as the experiences of PATCO in 1981 and
the New York City Transit Workers in 2005 demonstrate.112
In this regard, it is useful to review how states which
permit collective bargaining deal with teachers’ strikes.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO STRIKES IN MODERN U.S. PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR LAW
Most states that permit public employees to bargain
collectively have alternatives to strikes to resolve bargaining
impasses. These procedures “typically involve [some combination
of] mediation, fact-finding, and/or interest arbitration.”113
Mediation involves a neutral third party, with no power to
impose contract terms, meeting with the union and employer to
try to facilitate an agreement.114 Mediation is non-binding and is
typically most effective when there are other binding procedures
that follow if mediation is not successful.115
Fact-finding involves a neutral party (or panel) that,
literally, finds facts relevant to the bargaining impasse and
makes non-binding recommendations, based on those facts and
https://www.mlive.com/news/2016/01/illegal_teacher_strikes_common.html.
107. Id.
108. See Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 227 N.W.2d 736, 738-40
(Mich. 1975).
109. WISCONSIN HIST. SOC’Y, Hortonville Teachers’ Strike (last visited June 6, 2019),
https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/Records/Article/CS2486.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Greenhouse, supra note 19; see also James G. Pope et al., The Right to
Strike, BOSTON REVIEW (May 22, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/forum/james-graypope-ed-bruno-peter-kellman-right-strike.
113. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891.
114. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891.
115. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892.
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statutory criteria.116 The process gives the parties additional
information and a more realistic view of their chances at an
interest arbitration that often could follow fact-finding.117 The
statutory criteria fact-finders use are typically the same as those
interest arbitrators must use.118 The most common and usually
most important factors are analyzing comparable employees, the
employer’s ability to pay, the interest of the public, and past
labor contracts.119 The fact-finder’s recommendations are not
binding, but they can be very influential.120 First, if the process
moves beyond fact-finding to interest arbitration, the factfinder’s report and recommendations may be used as evidence in
the arbitration hearing.121 Second, some statutes make it
relatively difficult for parties to reject a fact-finders’
recommendations.122
Interest arbitration is the most common “last resort”
mechanism to settle bargaining impasses in public-sector law.123
It involves a neutral arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, holding
hearings, evaluating relevant evidence, and making decisions
that are usually, but not always binding, based on the evidence
and the criteria the public-sector statute describes.124 The
arbitration only applies to whatever issues remain at impasse
after negotiations and previous steps of the impasse resolution
process have ended.125
Some states end their impasse dispute procedures without
any arbitration or binding decision. For example, Florida,
Kansas, and Kentucky use only mediation and fact-finding.126
Georgia uses only mediation.127

116. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892.
117. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892.
118. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 893.
119. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 893.
120. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 892.
121. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897.
122. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 896-97.
123. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897.
124. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 897.
125. SEE HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891-97.
126. KEARNEY AND MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 269.
127. Id.
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VI. REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL STRIKES
Whether or not the state allows any public-sector employees
to strike under any circumstances, state laws routinely contain
sanctions against illegal strikes. The law on the books regarding
illegal strikes is often quite harsh. There are two main types of
remedies for illegal strikes: penalties against individual strikers
and penalties against unions.128 At the most severe end of the
scale, the law governing federal employees makes it a crime to
strike,129 and a number of the PATCO strikers in 1981 were
prosecuted criminally.130 While this is a minority approach, all
the PATCO strikers were also fired and the union PATCO was
decertified.131 Fines against unions and individual workers for
illegal strikes are common, and courts routinely enjoin illegal
strikes.132
A. Remedies Against Individual Strikers
The main penalties against individual employees who strike
illegally are usually fines, discipline (up to and including
discharge), and limits on future public employment.133 Ohio’s
law, for example, authorizes this type of discipline and fines of
up to two days’ pay for each day on an illegal strike.134 It also
provides that the employee’s compensation may not be increased
until at least a year after the strike. 135 Other state laws provide
similar penalties, with a few variations. Some states penalize
one day’s wages instead of two,136 while New York’s law requires
fines equal to twice the strikers’ daily rate of pay for each day on
strike in all cases.137
As the teachers’ strikes of 2018 showed, public employers do

128. See generally MALIN

ET AL., supra note 54, at 767-77 (discussing penalties for
illegaly striking employees and unions striking illegally).
129. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 767.
130. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885.
131. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885.
132. See discussion infra Part V.A. and Part V.B.
133. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §210(f) (LexisNexis 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§4117.23 (West 2018); see also Malin et al., supra note 54, at 767-68.
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.23.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1316(b) (2019)
137. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §210(f).
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not always exercise their authority to fire illegal strikers.138
Employers have both practical and political concerns, especially
if they wish to fire most or all teachers in a school district or
even state. Thus, when nearly all the public-school teachers in
West Virginia went on a (clearly illegal) strike, they were not
fired; in fact, they won a raise.139
Still, employers have exercised this power specifically
against teachers, and courts have given them wide discretion in
so doing. In Hortonville Joint School District v. Hortonville
Education Association140, the Supreme Court upheld the
discharge of a large number of teachers who struck illegally.141
The Court rejected a challenge under the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution.142
B. Remedies Against Unions
Employers typically file for injunctions against illegal
strikes, and, assuming the strike is illegal, courts routinely
grant them.143 While injunctions are equitable remedies, many
public-sector labor statutes specify that injunctions are available
to employers faced with an illegal strike.144 Public employers
seek such injunctions because they are the quickest way to end a
strike, before the normal procedures of civil litigation are
exhausted. A few cases have allowed unions to use an “unclean
hands” defense to an injunction action, if the employer provoked
the strike by failing to bargain in good faith.145 But few, if any,
138. See, e.g. Ron Allen & Ethan Sacks, West Virginia teachers strike ends after
governor approves raises, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/west-virginia-teachers-strike-statelawmakers-reach-deal-pay-raise-n854021; Michelle Goldberg, The Teacher’s Revolt in
West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/opinion/west-virginia-teachers-strike.html;.
139. Allen & Sacks, supra note 138; see also Goldberg, supra note 138.
140. Hortonvile Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482
(1976).
141. Id. at 497.
142. Id.
143. See MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 765-66 (discussing the “common availability
of injunctive relief” against illegally striking employees).
144. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1323 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§423.202a(9) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 111.70(7m)(a) (2019).
145. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Educ. Ass’n, 567 P.2d
830, 835 (1977); School Dist. For City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass’n, 157 N.W.2d
206, 211 (1968).
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jurisdictions follow that approach today.146
If a union continues to strike after a court issues an
injunction ordering the strike to cease, the union is subject to
contempt sanctions.147 Contempt can be civil, with penalties of
fines and in some cases it may be criminal, resulting in
additional fines and possible jail sentences for at least union
officials.148
A common rule that can affect teachers’ strikes is that, even
in states that permit some public employees to strike, strikes
which begin as legal strikes may be enjoined if, at some point
during the strike, the strike threatens the health, safety, and/or
welfare of the public.149 For example, the Ohio statute provides
that if “the public employer believes that a lawful strike creates
clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public,” it
may seek to have the strike enjoined.150 If the labor board and
court agree to the injunction, the parties will also be ordered to
resume bargaining with a mediator.151
These cases are often difficult for labor boards and courts
because of the obvious tension: strikes are meant to cause some
dislocations and inconveniences, so at what point does an
otherwise legal strike create the types of problems that threaten
the health, safety, or welfare of the public? In Armstrong School
District v. Armstrong Education Association152 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court revsersed the appeallate court’s order and
effectively held that cancellation of extracurricular activities,
community unrest, and loss of state subsidies if twelve
instructional days lost because of a strike could not be made up
in thirty-nine remaining days did not justify enjoining a strike
that was legal at its inception.153 In contrast, Jersey Shore
146. In Michigan, a 1994 amendment to the relevant state statute essentially
overruled the Holland case. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §423.202a(9).

147. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874.
148. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 874; see also, e.g., New York City Transit
Auth. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 822 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581-82 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) (illustrating fines as a contempt sanction against union).
149. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A) (West 2018); 43 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (West 2019).
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(B) (West 2018).
152. Armstrong School Dist v. Armstrong Educ. Ass’n, 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991),
superseded by statute, 1992 Pa. Laws 403 No. 88, as recognized in Carroll v. Ringgold
Educ. Ass’n, 655 A.2d 613 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
153. See id.; see also Armstrong Educ. Ass’n v. Armstrong School Dist., 542 A.2d
1047, (Pa Commw. Ct. 1988).
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Education Association v. Jersey Shore Area School District154
upheld an injunction of an initially legal teachers’ strike,
stressing that the strike threatened a loss of state subsidies to
schools because it could cause a failure to comply with a
statutory requirement of providing 180 days of instruction.155
Illustrating the difficulty of these cases, the decision prompted
two separate dissents.156
In some states, unions who strike illegally can be denied
any rights to “dues check-off” they have under a collective
bargaining contract, at least for a certain amount of time.157
“Dues check-off” means that the employer will automatically
deduct the dues individual members of union bargaining units
owe to the union that represents them, and forward the money
to their union.158 While the amount of dues employees owe
unions is independent of whether dues check-off exists, unions
obviously derive a benefit from this form of automatic deduction
(as opposed to having to bill members individually).
Some public-sector laws permit decertification of unions
that strike illegally.159 As noted above, PATCO was decertified
after its 1981 strike.160 Florida’s statute also specifies that
decertification is a potential penalty for an illegal strike.161
A minority of states allow private parties who suffered
damages because of an illegal public-sector strike to sue the
striking union and strikers to recover those damages.162 For
example, Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Association Local
1262163 held that because a firefighters’ strike was illegal, the
strikers owed a legal duty to property owners either not to strike
154. Jersey Shore Area School Dist. v. Jersey Shore Educ. Ass’n, 548 A.2d 1202 (N.J.
1988).

155. Id. at 1207-08.
156. See, id. at 1208-11.
157. See.,e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2) (2019); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(3)(f)
(LexisNexis 2010); see also MTA Bus Co. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 820
N.Y.S.2d 479 (2006) (applying N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(3)(f) dues forfeiture
penalty).
158. See Union Dues Checkoff as a Subject in Labor-Management Negotiations: Good
Faith Bargaining and NLRB Remedies, 39(2) FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 300 (1970).
159. See., e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2)
160. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 885; see also MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at
774.
161. FLA. STAT. § 447.507(6)(a)(2); see also MALIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 774.
162. See, e.g., Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Ass’n Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986).
163. Id.

210

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20.2

or to fight fires.164 Thus, strikers could be held individually
liable for damages their breach of that duty caused.165 A
majority of states have rejected this type of claim.166
The evidence on the effectiveness of sanctions is mixed.
Some evidence suggests that harsher strike sanctions do inhibit
strikes.167 The state of Michigan, for example, experienced fewer
teacher strikes after the state amended its public-sector statute
in the 1990s to enhance penalties for such strikes.168
On the other hand, studies have also shown that the best
way to avoid public-sector strikes is to provide robust collectivebargaining rights with effective processes for resolving
bargaining impasses.169 In both Ohio and Illinois, the number of
public-sector strikes decreased after each state passed a law
making strikes (and in the case of Ohio, collective bargaining
generally) legal for most public employees.170
It may seem counter-intuitive that legalizing an activity
would decrease the rate of participation in that activity. But, as
the 2018 teachers’ strikes arguably demonstrate, strikes may be
more likely when employees have no other option. In general,
strikes are least likely to occur in jurisdictions that provide for
compulsory, binding interest arbitration to resolve bargaining
disputes.171
Also, as the recent teachers’ strikes have shown, legal rules
are not the only determinative factor in the outcome of strikes.
While the PATCO strike was a disaster for the union and the
employees, under the very same federal law, eleven years
earlier, in 1970, U.S. postal workers engaged in a major work
164. Id. at 1081; see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891.
165. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 891.
166. See, e.g. Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2, 513 N.E.2d 1002
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); White v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 42, 738 S.W.2d 933 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) (all rejecting tort claims brought by private citizens against
illegal strikers).
167. See Martin Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 313, 328 n. 67 (1993) (citing studies regarding the relationship
between strike legalization and strike incidence) .
168. See Lawler, supra note 106 (“In 1994, [Michigan] Public Act 112 placed stricter
prohibitions on public school employee strikes specifically. Since that time,
strikes have become a rarity in the state.”)
169. See Malin, supra note 167, at 328 n. 67 (citing studies regarding the
relationship between strike legalization and strike incidence).
170. Malin, supra note 167, at 374-76.
171. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 247.

2019]

TEACHERS’ STRIKE OF 2018

211

stoppage with fairly positive results.172 Around 200,000 workers
struck, and ultimately the strike was settled with the union
receiving increased collective bargaining rights and a significant
pay hike.173
VII. CONCLUSION: OPTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WITHOUT
THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY OR STRIKE?
A. Modern Public Sector Labor Law Answers
For employees who lack both the right to strike and the
right to bargain collectively, there are no alternatives to strikes.
Not surprisingly, employees in states who lack collective
bargaining rights generally do worse, in terms of compensation,
than similarly-situated employees in states with collective
bargaining rights.174 Again, denying public employees collective
bargaining rights violates international norms, as expressed in
ILO rules.175 Indeed, denying many public employees the right to
strike may also run afoul of ILO practices.176 The Committee on
Freedom of Association of the ILO determined that the antistrike provisions of the New York public-sector labor law used
against striking transit workers violate international norms.177
Providing public employees with access to binding interest
arbitration as an alternative is more defensible, but the teachers
who struck in the spring of 2018 did not have access to any
alternative method of resolving bargaining impasses – they
didn’t even have the right to bargain.
What would a better option for teachers in states like those
that experienced strikes in 2018 look like? One could imagine
three alternatives. First, adopting the type of broad strike rights
that exist for private-sector employees and for most public
employees in comparable countries: no need to go through an
array of impasse procedures before striking. Second, extending

172. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 243.
173. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 4, at 243.
174. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on
the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 Cornell J.L. Pub. Pol’y 735 (comparing
public employees’ robust collective bargaining rights in Illinois with public
employees’ lack of collective bargaining rights in Virginia).
175. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 3.
176. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 3.
177. Pope et al., supra note 112, at 7 n.26.
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to such states the model used in U.S. states that permit some
public employees to strike, which generally requires exhausting
mediation and/or fact-finding before striking. Third, using
interest arbitration instead of strikes as the final way to resolve
bargaining impasses.
Unions have traditionally argued in favor of maximizing
strike rights. Rationales for this position have ranged from the
position that the right to strike is a fundamental right, to the
idea that strikes are the most effective way to maximize the
power of worker collective action.178 The problem with this
position in this context is that given political realities, this
option has essentially no chance of being adopted in the states
that experienced the teacher strikes in 2018, or, realistically, in
any significant number of states beyond those that currently
allow strikes. Further, if it were, given current political realities
in the U.S., one could easily see the types of practices that have
vitiated the practical power of strikes in the private sector used
in the public sector: specifically, the use of permanent
replacements.
And yet, interest arbitration has downsides as well.
Professor Martin Malin has argued in favor of the right to strike,
as opposed to interest arbitration.179 He argues that fears of
unions benefiting inordinately from a too-powerful strike
weapon have not been borne out by experience; that interest
arbitrators are too wedded to the status quo in fixing contract
terms; and that interest arbitration awards do not necessarily
reflect the importance of various issues to the parties.180
This author would choose the second option: using rules
that permit strikes, but under more limited circumstances than
in the private sector. In other words, adopt the rules used in
states that permit some public employees to strike in all
jurisdictions. At the time of this writing though, even that seems
fairly unrealistic for the states in question.

178. For a recent reiteration of these and other arguments, see Pope et al., supra
note 112.
179. See Malin, supra note 167, at 316-335.
180. Malin, supra note 167, at 333-34.
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B. The Scope of Bargaining Issues
Even were public-school teachers to gain more robust
bargaining rights, or even the right to strike legally, one final
problem would remain. Some of the issues the teachers struck
over – pay, for example – are classic examples of issues that are
negotiable, mandatory subjects of bargaining for teachers’ and
other unions.181
Some of the issues involved in the strikes, however, involve
issues that even the most robust public-sector labor laws do not
require government bodies to negotiate: most significantly, levels
of school funding.182 It seems even more unrealistic to expect the
states that experienced the teachers’ strikes in 2018 to require
or even tolerate unions regularly negotiating about that topic.
Indeed, requiring employers to negotiate with unions on that
topic raises a number of serious policy questions beyond the
scope of this essay.
Still, the teachers’ strikes of 2018 should teach even old
hands in the field that unions are capable of surprising and
impressive accomplishments. Perhaps these strikes will be a
spur to move from a checkered history to a different and brighter
future.

181. For a thorough discussion of the scope of bargaining rules in public-sector labor
law, see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 739-92.

182. See, e.g., Erin Johansson, Collective Bargaining 101 (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.jwj.org/collective-bargaining-101; NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
Collective Bargaining (Section 8(d) & 8(b)(3)), https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/whats-law/unions/collective-bargaining-section-8d-8b3 (last visited June 11,
2019); Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining
in the States, 4-8 (Mar. 2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf
(all discussing subjects of collective bargaining agreements, without a single
reference to school funding).
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